

delelser udgivet af Det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab, 37:4 (1958): 52-53, © Det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab.

The transcript of the "White Night" tape recording from Jonestown is reprinted in Appendix 2 with permission from *The New York Times*, 15 March 1979, © 1979 by The New York Times Company. Reprinted by permission.

Introduction

If we have understood the archeological and textual record correctly, man has had his entire history in which to imagine deities and modes of interaction with them. But man, more precisely western man, has had only the last few centuries in which to imagine religion.¹ It is this act of second order, reflective imagination which must be the central preoccupation of any student of religion. That is to say, while there is a staggering amount of data, of phenomena, of human experiences and expressions that might be characterized in one culture or another, by one criterion or another, as religious—*there is no data for religion*. Religion is solely the creation of the scholar's study. It is created for the scholar's analytic purposes by his imaginative acts of comparison and generalization. Religion has no independent existence apart from the academy. For this reason, the student of religion, and most particularly the historian of religion, must be relentlessly self-conscious. Indeed, this self-consciousness constitutes his primary expertise, his foremost object of study.

For the self-conscious student of religion, no datum possesses intrinsic interest. It is of value only insofar as it can serve as *exempli gratia* of some fundamental issue in the imagination of religion. The student of religion must be able to articulate clearly why "this" rather than "that" was chosen as an exemplum. His primary skill is concentrated in this choice. This effort at articulate choice is all the more difficult, and hence all the more necessary, for the historian of religion who accepts neither the boundaries of canon nor of community in constituting his intellectual domain, in providing his range of exempla.

Implicit in this effort at articulate choice are three conditions. First, that the exemplum has been well and fully understood. This requires a mastery of both the relevant primary material and the history and tradition of its interpretation. Second, that the exemplum be displayed in the service of some important theory, some paradigm, some fundamental question, some central element in the academic imagination of religion. Third, that there be some method for explicitly relating the exemplum to the theory,

paradigm, or question and some method for evaluating each in terms of the other.

The first three essays brought together in this volume attempt to fulfill this agenda with respect to data drawn from the study of Judaism. The interest of the historian of religion in these materials cannot depend on apologetic, historical, or demographic reasons. That is to say, the interest in Judaism for the imagination of religion cannot be merely because it is "there," because it has played some role in our collective invention of western civilization, or because some students of religion happen to be Jews. Rather, it is because of the peculiar position of Judaism within the larger framework of the imagining of western religion: close, yet distant; similar, yet strange; "occidental," yet "oriental"; commonplace, yet exotic. This tension between the familiar and the unfamiliar, at the very heart of the imagining of Judaism, has enormous cognitive power. It invites, it requires comparison. Judaism is foreign enough for comparison and interpretation to be necessary; it is close enough for comparison and interpretation to be possible.² By virtue of its tensive situation between the near and the far, Judaism provides an important test case for central methodological issues such as definition and comparison besides illuminating the larger areas of imagination, self-consciousness, and choice crucial to the academic study of religion.³

The second group of essays (chaps. 4-7) plays with the same tension, but from another point of view. In this, I have been much influenced by a passage in *An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue* by that remarkable figure of the eighteenth century Scottish Enlightenment, Francis Hutcheson:

The late ingenious author [Lord Shaftesbury] has justly observed the absurdity of the monstrous taste which has possessed both the readers and writers of travels. They are sparing enough in account of the natural affections, the families, associations and friendships of the [American] Indians . . . indeed, of all their normal pursuits. They say, "These are but common stories. No need to travel to the Indies for what we see in Europe every day." The entertainment, therefore, in these ingenious studies consists chiefly in exciting horror and making men stare. The ordinary employment of the bulk of the Indians . . . has nothing of the prodigious, but a human sacrifice, a feast upon enemies' carcasses can raise a horror and admiration of the wondrous barbarity of the Indians.⁴

This extract, it seems to me, states with precision the most interesting dilemma of choice confronting the student of religion. Does one focus on those things which "excite horror and make men stare," or does one concentrate on "common stories," on "what we see in Europe every day"? It is a tension between religion imagined as an *exotic* category of human experience and expression, and religion imagined as an *ordinary* category of human expression and activity.

It has been my continued presupposition that the latter choice for imagination is the more productive for the development of history of religions as an academic enterprise. And therefore, that characteristic history of religions materials such as myths are best approached as "common stories," as pieces of prosaic discourse rather than as multivalent, condensed, highly symbolic speech. In short, I hold that there is *no privilege* to myth or other religious materials. They must be understood primarily as texts in context, specific acts of communication between specified individuals, at specific points in time and space, about specifiable subjects. Kenneth Burke's definition of a proverb as a "strategy for dealing with a situation" provides an important insight when extended to these materials.⁵ For the historian of religion, the task then becomes one of imagining the "situation," of constructing the context, insofar as it is relevant to his interpretative goals. This implies, as well, that there is no privilege to the so-called exotic. For there is no *primordium*—it is all history. There is no "other,"—it is all "what we see in Europe every day."

Nevertheless, the historian of religion, like the anthropologist, will continue to gain insight from the study of materials and cultures which, at first glance, appear uncommon or remote. For there is extraordinary cognitive power in what Victor Shklovsky termed "defamiliarization"—making the familiar seem strange *in order to enhance our perception of the familiar*.⁶ The success of any historian of religion's work depends upon a judgment as to whether this enhancement has taken place.

The essays collected together in this volume are as well the efforts of a teacher. Each was written during my tenure as dean of the College of the University of Chicago. Each had its origin in a specific classroom situation as I attempted to describe, through concrete example, the particular angle of vision of the historian of religion. As such, each essay has a double pedagogic intent: to cast light upon a specific religious phenomenon and to do so in such a way that the characteristic preoccupations and strategies of the historian of religion be better revealed.

Once again, Jacob Neusner has served as the editor of the series in which my work appears. Jack has been my valued conversation partner for more than twenty years. What is more important, through his efforts at organizing meetings, his various publication endeavors, his unfailing sponsorship of younger colleagues, he has been the single most vital force in the academic study of religion in this country. I owe much to him as I do to the incisive criticism and constant stimulation of my dear friend Hans Penner. In some profound sense, I have never left that magical year when Jack, Hans and I were colleagues at Dartmouth College.

This volume is dedicated to two remarkable individuals who allowed me to join their family some fifteen years ago. They have both taught me much that cannot be acknowledged in footnotes.

they're doing is going to a quiet rest. I call on you to stop this now, if you have any respect at all. Are we black, proud, Socialists—or what are we? Now stop this nonsense. Don't carry this on anymore. You're exciting your children.

All over and it's good. No—no sorrow that it's all over. I'm glad it's over. Hurry, Hurry, my children. Hurry. All I—the hands of the enemy. Hurry, my children. Hurry. There are seniors out there that I'm concerned about. Hurry. I don't want any of my seniors to this mess. Only quickly, quickly, quickly, quickly, quickly. Let's just—Good knowing you.

No more pain, Al. No more pain, I said, Al. No more pain. Jim Cobb is laying on the airfield dead at this moment. [Applause] Remember, the Oliver woman said she—she'd come over and kill me if her son wouldn't stop her. These, these are the people—the peddlers of hate. All we're doing is laying down our lives. We're not letting them take our lives. We're laying down our lives. Peace in their lives. They just want peace.

Man: I'd just like to say that my—my so-called parents are filled with so much hate and treachery. I think you people out here should think about your relatives were and be glad about that the children are being laid to rest. And I'd like to say that I thank Dad for making me strong to stand with it all and make me ready for it. Thank you.

Jones: All they do is taking a drink. They take it to go to sleep. That's what death is, sleep—I'm tired of it all.

Woman: Everything we could have ever done, most loving thing of all of us could have done and it's been a pleasure walking with all of you in this revolutionary struggle. No other way I would rather go than to give my life for socialism, communism. And I thank Dad very, very much.

Woman: Dad's love and nursing, goodness and kindness and bring us to this land of freedom. His love—his mother was the advance—the advance guard to socialism. And his love, his nurses will go on forever unto the fields of—

Jones: —to that, to that, to that, words to that—was the green scene thing.

Woman: Go on unto the sign. And thank you, Dad.

Jones: With the green—and please bring it here so the adults can begin.

—you don't, don't fail to follow my advice. You'll be sorry. You'll be sorry.

We do it, than they do it. Have trust. You have to step across. We used to think this world was—this world was not our home, and it sure isn't—saying, it sure wasn't.

—don't want to tell them. All he's doing—if they will tell them—assure these—can't some people assure these children of the—in stepping over to the next plane. They set an example for others. We said—one thousand people who said, we don't like the way the world is. Take our life from us. We laid it down. We got tired. We didn't commit suicide, we committed an act of revolutionary suicide protesting the conditions of an inhumane world.

[Organ music]

Notes

Introduction

1. The history of the imagination of religion has yet to be written. Perhaps the most useful work, to date, is M. Despland, *La Religion en Occident* (Montreal, 1979), but it is far from adequate.

2. I play, here, with Dilthey's hermeneutic formulation: "Interpretation would be impossible if expressions of life were completely strange. It would be unnecessary if nothing strange were in them. It lies, therefore, between these two extremes" (W. Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften* [Stuttgart, 1958]), 7:255.

3. See J. Neusner, ed., *Take Judaism, for Example* (Chicago, 1982) for a volume constructed around the notion of Judaism as providing *exempli gratia* for religious studies. While I am uncomfortable with the category "world religions" Neusner's enterprise ought to be extended to each of the major traditions in a series of volumes. At minimum, this would make possible the beginning of a responsible undergraduate sequence in "world religions," something impossible with our present textbooks which are either encyclopaedias of trivia or idiosyncratic attempts at synthesis.

4. F. Hutcheson, *An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue in Two Treatises*, 4th ed. (London, 1738), pp. 206–7. The first edition was published anonymously in Dublin in 1725. In the passage quoted, I have modernized both the spelling and punctuation.

5. K. Burke, *The Philosophy of Literary Form*, rev. ed. (New York, 1957), p. 256.

6. V. Shklovsky, "Art as Technique," in L. T. Lemon and M. J. Reis, eds., *Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays* (Lincoln, 1965), esp. pp. 13–22.

Chapter 1

1. F. Ponge, *Le Grand Recueil*, vol. 2, *Méthodes* (Paris, 1961), pp. 41–42.

2. For an excellent introduction to the theoretical issues of library classification, see A. Broadfield, *The Principles of Classification* (London, 1946). On alphabetical ordering, see L. W. Daly, *Contributions to a History of Alphabetization in Antiquity and the Middle Ages* (Brussels, 1967).

3. For an initial orientation to taxonomy, see J. Z. Smith, "Animals and Plants in Myths and Legends," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 15th ed., 1:916–18.

4. This is a simplification for purposes of illustration. What I have provided, above, is a "key" rather than a "taxonomy." On this distinction, see G. G. Simpson, *Principles of Animal Taxonomy* (New York, 1961), pp. 13–17. For a properly complex discussion of the taxonomy of the *Juglandaceae*, see J. F. Levy, *Etudes sur les Juglandaceae* (Paris, 1955) in the series *Mémoires du Muséum National d'Histoire Naturelle*, n.s. B, "Botanique," vol. 6.

6 A Pearl of Great Price and a Cargo of Yams: A Study in Situational Incongruity

In recent years, a number of somewhat superficial comparisons have been proposed between early Jewish and Christian apocalyptic and messianic movements and the widespread, contemporary religious phenomena variously designated as cargo cults or nativistic revitalization movements.¹ This essay is an attempt at a more complex mode of analysis of this topic by means of a comparison of the ritual texts for the Babylonian New Year (Akitu) festival with the Ceramese myth of Hainuwele. Both of these texts are believed by scholars to be extremely "archaic" and have been employed as paradigms for the interpretation of other texts (the former, most prominently by the Myth-Ritual school; the latter, by the Frobenius *Schule*). Both have been subjected to intensive analysis and enjoy a consensus as to the broad outlines of their interpretation. I shall dissent from this consensus. Neither text has been previously identified as being related either to apocalyptic tradition or to a cargo cult. I shall insist on such a relationship. By taking so quixotic and experimental an approach to these texts and by invoking the notion of situational incongruity,² I hope to suggest to my colleagues in the history of religions, biblical studies, and anthropology some possibilities for fruitful collaboration.³

With respect to both of the texts to be discussed in this paper, I should like to employ a simple stratagem in order to gain a point of entry. I would hope that the reader will be seized by an element of incongruity in each text, that he will both trust his sense of incongruity and allow himself to suppose that the same element appeared incongruous to the originators of the text, and that, thereby, he will be led to presume that the text is, among other things, a working with this incongruity.

I

The portion of the Akitu festival to which I want to draw attention is that for which it is most justly famous—the so-called ritual humiliation of the king on the fifth day of Nisannu:

(415) When he [the king] reaches [the presence of the god], the *urigallu*-priest shall leave (the sanctuary) and take away the scepter, the circle and the sword [from the king]. He shall bring them [before the god Bel] and place them [on] a chair. He shall leave (the sanctuary) and strike the king's cheek. (420) He shall place the . . . behind him. He shall accompany him (the king) into the presence of the god Bel . . . he shall drag (him by) the ears and make him bow down to the ground. . . . The king shall speak the following words (only once): "I did [not] sin, lord of the countries. I was not neglectful (of the requirements) of your godship. [I did not] destroy Babylon. I did not command its overthrow. (425) [I did not] . . . the temple Esagil. I did not forget its rites. I did not rain blows on the cheeks of a protected citizen.⁴ . . . I did not humiliate them. I watched out for Babylon. I did not smash its walls.

.
(Response of the *urigallu*-priest)

Have no fear . . . (435) which the god Bel. . . . The god Bel [will listen to] your prayer . . . he will magnify your lordship . . . he will exalt your kingship. . . . On the day of the *eššešu*-festival, do . . . (440) in the festival of the Opening of the Gate, purify [your] hands . . . day and night. . . . [The god Bel], whose city is Babylon . . . whose temple is Esagil . . . whose dependents are the people of Babylon. . . . (445) The god Bel will bless you . . . forever. He will destroy your enemy, fell your adversary." After (the *urigallu*-priest) says (this), the scepter, circle and sword [shall be restored] to the king. He (the priest) shall strike the king's cheek, (450) if the tears flow, (it means that) the god Bel is friendly; if no tears appear, the god Bel is angry: the enemy will rise up and bring about his downfall.⁵

The central acts of the ritual—the startling portrait of a king being slapped and pulled about by his ears—have most usually been interpreted as symbolic of "dying-rising." I am convinced, especially by the researches of Lambrechts, that this is an illegitimate category for archaic Near Eastern religions. What evidence exists for a "dying-rising" pattern is from the Late Antique and Christian eras, with the possible exception of Dumuzi, whose alternation between earth and the underworld does not conform to the alleged pattern.⁶ In other interpretations, the humiliation is understood to be a descent into chaos (or Saturnalian role reversal) characteristic of New Year celebrations, or as a ritual expiation by the king on behalf of his people (i.e., as a scapegoat pattern).⁷ Certainly the sequence of actions appears incongruous and without parallel.⁸

But these actions, understood as the humiliation of the king, have deflected attention from the even more incongruous "negative confession."⁹ What *native* king of Babylonia ever contemplated or was guilty of destroying or overthrowing his capital city, Babylon, smashing its walls, or neglecting or destroying its major temple, Esagila? These would be in-

conceivable actions for a native king. But these *were* the actions of *foreign* kings (Assyrian, Persian, and Seleucid) who gained the throne of Babylon by conquest: the best-known examples, among others, would be Sennacherib, Xerxes, and Antigonos. As with Cyrus among the Israelites (whose promise to rebuild Jerusalem and restore its national temple concludes the Jewish version of the Hebrew Scriptures as organized after the Roman destruction of the temple), so too for the Babylonians—foreign kings could be named who restored Babylon and its temple, Esagila: Tiglath-Pileser III, Sargon II, Ashurbanipal, Nebuchadnezzar, Cyrus, Alexander, Seleucus I, Antiochus I, and Antiochus IV. Read in this light, the ritual of the Akitu festival becomes, in part, a piece of nationalistic religious propaganda. If the present king acts as the evil foreign kings have acted, he will be stripped of his kingship by the gods; if he acts in the opposite manner and “grasps the hand of Marduk,” his kingship will be established and protected by the gods.

This combination of elements is paralleled in the Seleucid era “copy” of the previously unknown Adad-shuma-usur Epic recently published by A. K. Grayson. It narrates the rebellion by a group of native Babylonians against a foreign (Kassite) king. “The cause of the rebellion was neglect [by the king] of Marduk and Babylon . . . after the rebellion, the penitent king confesses his sins to Marduk and thereafter carries out the restoration of the temple, Esagil.” The relevant portion of the text (II.22–31) is fragmentary, but, like the Akitu festival, contains a royal confession and a reference to the *kidinnu*.¹⁰

Such an interpretation of the Akitu festival is rendered all the more plausible by the dating of the two surviving cuneiform texts of the ritual. Despite the assumption of most scholars, that the texts provide a witness to “the New Year Festival in the form it took at Babylon in the first millennium,”¹¹ both copies are, in fact, from the *Seleucid* period. The various earlier texts, which speak of Marduk being captured and imprisoned, which have often been homologized to the “ritual humiliation” of the king under the pattern “dying-rising,” are, in fact, of Assyrian rather than Babylonian provenance and would appear to be parodies rather than accounts of actual rituals.¹² My own conjecture would be that, while there are clearly ancient references to *an* Akitu festival, the situation and ideology projected by the Seleucid ritual texts go back no earlier than the time of Sargon II (i.e., 709 B.C.)—the earliest conqueror of Babylon consciously to adopt the Babylonian pattern and etiquette of kingship¹³—under whose rule, for the first time, one encounters texts which speak of the pattern of Assyrian recognition of the rights and privileges of the “protected citizens” of Babylon.¹⁴ The ritual would remain relevant through the reign of Antiochus IV, the founder of the *polis* of Babylon according to an inscription dated September 166 B.C.,¹⁵ although with

heightened tension, as a pattern designed to deal with more proximate Assyrian monarchs is *reapplied* to the more foreign Seleucid rulers.

It may be that the ritual text is a witness to a *reinterpretation* of a more archaic ritual. Note that the king is slapped twice: once in the “humiliation” scene and once, after his reenthronement, as an oracular action.

The scepter, circle and sword [shall be restored] to the king. He (the priest) shall strike the king’s cheek, if the tears flow, (it means that) the god Bel is friendly; if no tears appear, the god Bel is angry: the enemy will rise up and bring about his downfall.

It is this second slapping that may be the original element in the ritual. In its most archaic form, it was probably a ritual to insure rain for the New Year inasmuch as the association of tears and blessing makes little sense in any other context.¹⁶ Such a rain ritual would be reinterpreted as a general oracle of political success and prosperity, and then, in the first slapping, reinterpreted and replicated as a piece of nationalistic propaganda. It may, in fact, be fruitful to consider the two slapping incidents in the same ritual program as a case of redundancy, with the second reinforcing the political context of the first. That is, if the king does not comport himself as a proper, native Babylonian king (first slapping), the gods will be angry and “the enemy will rise up and bring about his downfall” (second slapping). The first implies a direct divine sanction; the second, an indirect divine sanction.

If this interpretation of the “humiliation” episode is correct, then we may gain a new understanding of the central role of the so-called creation epic, Enuma elish, in the New Year’s ritual. It is now a general consensus that a major presupposition of the Myth-Ritual school was in error. Contrary to what has been maintained, the Akitu festival was not a reenactment of the creation myth. But it has been rarely noted that, apart from an enigmatic commentary of Assyrian provenance,¹⁷ our sole Babylonian witness to the connection of the Enuma elish with the Akitu festival is the same ritual text from the Seleucid era we have been considering.¹⁸ I am tempted to adopt Pallis’s suggestion that, in the ritual text, “Enuma eliš is no fixed concept. . . . Enuma eliš simply denotes a version of the creation story in general,”¹⁹ and I will insist that, whatever text is being referred to, it is not necessarily the “epic” as reconstructed by modern scholarship under that title.

Nevertheless, the “humiliation” of the king on day five is preceded by the recitation of a cosmogonic text on day four—whatever that text may have been. I take this to be significant. If we may use the general form of the reconstructed “creation epic” to gain a point of bearing, then it becomes important to emphasize that Enuma elish is not simply, or even primarily, a cosmogony. It is preeminently the myth of the establishment

of Marduk's kingship and the creation of his city (Babylon) and his central capital temple (Esagila). These are parallel creations. Originally redacted during the first period of Assyrian domination (and here I must accept Lambert's observation that "the *Epic of Creation* is not a norm of Babylonian or Sumerian cosmology. It is a sectarian and aberrant combination of mythological threads woven into an unparalleled compositum. . . . The various traditions it draws upon are often so perverted to such an extent that conclusions based on this text alone are suspect")²⁰ Enuma elish establishes clear parallels between Marduk's kingship in heaven and the kingship of Babylon, the creation of the world and the building of Esagila.²¹ The opposite would be the case as well. Destroy Babylon or Esagila, neglect Marduk, pervert kingship, and the world will be destroyed.

Before introducing one additional set of Babylonian materials, it is necessary to pause and reflect on the implications of this analysis of the Akitu festival for the more general theme. I am not claiming that the ritual of the Akitu festival is an apocalyptic *text*. I am suggesting that it reflects on an apocalyptic *situation*. In the Near Eastern context, two elements are crucial: scribalism and kingship. The *situation* of apocalypticism seems to me to be the cessation of native kingship; the *literature* of apocalypticism appears to me to be the expression of archaic, scribal wisdom as it comes to lack a royal patron. Indeed, I would suggest further that the perception of the meaning of the *fact* of the cessation of native kingship moves from the *apocalyptic pattern* that the wrong king is on the throne, that the cosmos will be thereby destroyed, and that the right god will either restore proper native kingship (his terrestrial counterpart) or will assume kingship himself, to the *gnostic pattern* that if the wrong king is sitting on the throne, then his heavenly counterpart must likewise be the wrong god. Both the apocalyptic and gnostic patterns reflect a situational incongruity: the king is the divine center of the human realm just as the king-god is the center of the cosmos; but the king is the wrong king. What does this portend for the world? What does this imply about the deity? What does this suggest about the archaic, civic rituals of renewal?

This "situation" is only implicit in the Akitu ritual. An archaic omen procedure concerning a native king has been reinterpreted as a *ritual for the rectification of a foreign king*.²² I suspect that this reinterpretation had its origins in the period of the Assyrian domination of Babylonia²³ and has been "reapplied" in the Seleucid era—with notable success in the case of a figure such as Antiochus I, Sotēr.²⁴

This matter of *rectification* is central to the apocalyptic situation and is crucial with respect to other interpretive models for the Akitu ritual. It suggests, on the one hand, that the Akitu festival is not best understood as a ritual of repetition of ahistorical cosmic patterns; and, on the other,

that the text should not be reduced through emphasis on its historical dimension to either an instance of nonefficacious propaganda²⁵ or to an instance of the use of historical realia as *vaticinia ex eventu*.²⁶ The first slapping of the king in the Akitu festival is not, as is the case with the second slapping, either validated *by events* (as in omen or prophetic traditions) or a validation *of events* (as in archaic rituals), but rather is best understood as a desperate ritual attempt to *influence events*, to set things right. This rectification has both cosmic and human dimensions, as kingship possesses both dimensions.

I have already noted that the cosmic dimension of the ritual is signaled by the recitation of the Enuma elish, but that we need not identify the text referred to in the ritual with the "creation epic" as reconstructed by contemporary scholarship. The fragments of Enuma elish from the second century B.C., those most closely contemporary to the Seleucid Akitu ritual, do not permit confident reconstruction.²⁷ But a more precious and contemporary source has survived in the fragments of the *Babyloniaka* by Berossus, a priest of Marduk in Babylon (fl. 290–280 B.C.).²⁸ His work, dedicated to Antiochus I, Sotēr, is an example of the widespread pattern of the paraphrase of archaic, native-language, sacred traditions in Greek during the Greco-Roman period (the closest parallels would be Manetho, Josephus, and the works of Alexander Polyhistor).

The testimonia concerning Berossus divide into two categories: from Greco-Roman authors we learn that he was an astronomer, an astrologer, and related to the sibylline tradition; from Jewish and Christian authors we learn that he was a mythographer and an historian. While these two types of testimonia clearly value different aspects of Berossus and put him to different uses, *taken as a whole* they reveal an overall pattern that closely approaches the apocalyptic: a history of the cosmos and a people from creation to final catastrophe, dominated by astrological determinism.²⁹ On the basis of the surviving fragments, the *Babyloniaka* appears to have described the history of the world from its creation to its final destruction and offers a periodization of the history of Babylonia which stretches in between. In the former, Berossus draws upon a learned, literate, mythological tradition similar to that represented by Enuma elish and its commentaries; in the latter, on an equally learned, literate, chronicle tradition. A number of elements in Berossus's work parallel motifs found in apocalyptic literature: the tradition of the antediluvian books of Oannes (F1, Jacoby) and the hidden books of Xisuthrus (F4) which contain cosmological and deluge traditions clearly related to those in the Atrahasis epic, Gilgamesh, and Enuma elish; the recording of the deeds of foreign kings including their destruction or restoration of Esagila and the city wall of Babylon (especially, F9 and the parallel locus in Abydenus, Jacoby F6 + 1, which explicitly correlates the building and rebuilding of the walls

with the creation of the cosmos);³⁰ and the correlation of the rule of foreign kings with the rise of idolatry and religious desecration (F11). In the key "apocalyptic" fragment which has survived (F21), beginning and end are clearly correlated. All things will be consumed by fire. The world will be flooded and return to the watery chaos that existed in the beginning.³¹ Nevertheless, Berossus and Abydenus should be more properly called *protoapocalypticists*. For, on the basis of what has survived, while there is an explicit cosmic frame of reference, there is no explicit correlation between historical events and the final end, although the pervasive determinism tends toward an implicit correlation. All of the elements of apocalypticism are present, but they do not appear to have been arranged in an apocalyptic schema. But Berossus and Abydenus remain of value to us for suggesting how *Enuma elish* might have been understood by the learned, priestly circles who developed the Akitu ritual and for enabling us to perceive the movement from prediction to rectification, from cosmogonic to apocalyptic patterns, from apocalyptic situation to apocalyptic text.

It will not be possible to pursue this line of inquiry further without first venturing an interpretation of the Ceramese myth of Hainuwele.

II

The myth of Hainuwele was first collected from the Wemale tribe of West Ceram, one of the Moluccan islands west of New Guinea, in 1927.³² But the tale was ignored until Adolf Jensen collected several versions of it in 1937–38, and devoted a brilliant and influential series of monographs and articles to its exegesis.³³ Since its publication, many of the most important historians of religion concerned with archaic traditions have written about the Hainuwele myth, and a general consensus has emerged.³⁴ It is this consensus which needs to be challenged.

The text is too long to quote in its entirety, so I shall offer only a brief summary, partially justified because the only version that Jensen translates strikes me as a composite paraphrase.³⁵ It begins: "Nine families of mankind came forth in the beginning from Mount Nunusaku where the people had emerged from clusters of bananas," and goes on to narrate how an ancestor (one of the *Dema*, the Marind-anim term for ancestor employed by Jensen as a generic title) named Ameta found a coconut speared on a boar's tusk, and, in a dream, was instructed to plant it. In six days a palm had sprung from the nut and flowered. Ameta cut his finger and his blood dripped on the blossom. Nine days later a girl grew from the blossom and, in three more days, she became an adolescent. Ameta cut her from the tree and named her Hainuwele, "coconut girl": "But she was not like an ordinary person, for when she would answer the call of nature, her excrement consisted of all sorts of valuable articles, such as Chinese

dishes and gongs, so that Ameta became very rich." During a major religious festival, Hainuwele stood in the middle of the dance grounds and, instead of *exchanging* the *traditional* areca nuts and betel leaves, she excreted a whole series of valuable articles: Chinese porcelain dishes, metal knives, copper boxes, golden earrings, and great brass gongs. After nine days of this: "The people thought this thing mysterious . . . they were jealous that Hainuwele could distribute such wealth and decided to kill her." The people dug a hole in the middle of the dance ground, threw Hainuwele in, and danced the ground firm on top of her. Ameta dug up her corpse, dismembered it, and buried the cut pieces. From the pieces of her corpse, previously unknown plant species (especially tuberous plants) grew which have been, ever since, the principal form of food on Ceram.

Jensen (like almost all historians of religion who have followed him) understands the tale to describe the origins of death, sexuality, and cultivated food plants. The myth, it is claimed, is a description of human existence as distinct from ancestral times—with the act of killing (in Jensen's phrase, "creative murder") as the means of maintaining the present order. Besides introducing the notion of "creative murder," which I find chilling in a series of essays published in Nazi Germany beginning in 1938, Jensen has demonstrably misread his own text.

I find no hint in the Hainuwele text that sexuality or death is the result of Hainuwele's murder nor that the cultivation of food plants is solely the consequence of her death. Death and sexuality (and their correlation) are already constitutive of human existence in the very first line of the text with its mention of the emergence of man from clusters of bananas. It is a widespread Oceanic tale of the origin of death—found as well among the Wemale in a version collected by Jensen—that human finitude is the result of a choice or conflict between a stone and a banana.³⁶ Bananas are large, perennial herbs which put forth tall, vigorous shoots which die after producing fruit. The choice, the conflict in these origin-of-death tales, is between progeny followed by death of the parents (the banana) or eternal but sterile life (the stone). The banana always wins. Thus Jensen's interpretation collapses at the outset. Man as mortal and sexual, indeed the correlation of death and sexuality, is the *presupposition* of the myth of Hainuwele, *not* its result. Ameta's dream oracle commanding him to plant the coconut, which occurs before the "birth" of Hainuwele, indicates that the cultivation of plants is likewise present. In fact, Jensen's interpretation rests on only a few details in the myth: that Hainuwele was killed, buried, dug up, and dismembered and that, from the pieces of her body which were then reburied, tuberous plants grew. This is a widespread motif,³⁷ rendered more "plausible" by the fact that this is the way in which tubers such as yams are actually cultivated. The tuber is stored in

the ground, dug up, and divided into pieces; these are then planted and result in new tubers. That tropical yams (such as *Dioscorea alata* or *D. batatas*) can grow to a length of several feet and weigh a hundred pounds only strengthens the analogy with the human body.

If Jensen's exegesis may be set aside on the basis of the evidence he provides, what is the myth about? Here I return to the stratagem I proposed at the outset for gaining a point of entry into the text. Our sense of incongruity is seized by Hainuwele's curious mode of production, the excretion of valuable articles, and it is this act which is explicitly stated as providing the motivation for the central act in the tale, her murder. We share our sense of incongruity with the Wemale, for "they thought this thing mysterious . . . and plotted to kill her."

There is, in fact, a double incongruity, for the objects that Hainuwele excretes are all manufactured goods, goods which are used on Ceram as money (*hárta*). The text clearly cannot antedate the spice trade of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (I shall, in fact, argue that it is considerably later).³⁸ The myth of Hainuwele is not a tale of the origin of death or of yams; it is a tale of the origin of "filthy lucre," of "dirty money."³⁹

The myth of Hainuwele is not, as in Jensen's interpretation, primarily concerned with the discrepancy between the world of the *Dema*-ancestors and the world of men. It is, I would suggest, concerned with the discrepancy between the world of the European and the world of the native; it is a witness to the confrontation between native and European economic systems. The text is important not because it opens up a vista to an archaic tuber cultivator culture dominated by a "central mythical idea,"⁴⁰ but because it reflects what I would term a *cargo situation* without a cargo cult. It reflects a native strategy for dealing with an incongruous situation, a strategy that draws upon indigenous elements. The myth of Hainuwele is not a primordium, it is a stunning example of what Jensen denigrates as "application."⁴¹

In order to understand this, we must detour just a bit from the Moluccas to the immediately adjacent island of New Guinea and the Melanesian culture complex. In Melanesian exchange systems, the central ideology is one of "equivalence, neither more nor less, neither 'one up' nor 'one down.'" ⁴² Foodstuffs and goods are stored, not as capital assets, but in order to be given away in ceremonies that restore equilibrium. Wealth and prestige are not measured by either resourceful thrift or conspicuous consumption, but by one's skill in achieving reciprocity. Exchange goods are familiar. They are local objects which a man grows or manufactures. Theoretically, everyone could grow or make the same things in the same quantity. Difference is, then, a matter of "accident" and must be "averaged out" through exchange.⁴³

Foreign trade goods and money function in quite a different way and their introduction into Oceania created a social and moral crisis that we may term the cargo situation.⁴⁴ How could one enter into reciprocal relations with the white man who possesses and hoards all this "stuff," whose manufacture took place in some distant land which the native has never seen? How does one achieve equilibrium with the white man who does not appear to have "made" his money? If the white man was merely a stranger (i.e., a nonkinsman), the problem would be serious, but it might not threaten every dimension of Melanesian life. But in Melanesian traditions, the ancestors are white, and, therefore, the native cannot simply ignore the European even if this was a pragmatic possibility. The white man is one of their own, but he refuses to play according to the rules, or is ignorant of them.⁴⁵ The problem of reciprocity cannot be avoided. What can the native do to make the white man—his ancestor who has returned on a ship with goods as promised by ancient tradition⁴⁶—admit to his reciprocal obligations?

It is necessary to be quite insistent at this point. The problem of cargo is *not* that the prophecy has failed or that the *parousia* has been delayed. It is rather that the prophecy has been fulfilled, but in an unexpected or "wrong" way. The ancestors *have* returned on a ship, they *have* brought cargo; but they have not distributed it properly in such a way as to achieve equilibrium. As with the Akitu festival, the cargo situation gives rise to myths and rituals concerned with *rectification*. Only the "pressure" is more severe than in the Near East. The center of native culture has not been occupied by a foreign king who does not behave in the required manner, but by one's own ancestor who does not behave in the required manner. "We have encountered the enemy and he is us."

A variety of means have been employed to meet this cargo situation. In explicit Melanesian cargo cults, it is asserted that another ship or airplane will arrive from the ancestors carrying an equal amount of goods for the natives. Or that the goods brought by the Europeans were originally intended for the natives but that the labels have been readdressed. A native "savior" will journey to the land of the ancestors in order either to correct the labels or to bring a new shipment, or the ancestors will redress the injustice on their own initiative.

In other more desperate cargo cults, the natives have destroyed everything that they own, as if, by this dramatic gesture, to awaken the white man's moral sense of reciprocity. "See, we have now given away everything. What will you give in return?" Both of these "solutions" assume the validity of exchange and reciprocity and appeal to it.

Other "solutions," usually not expressed as cargo cults but expressive of the cargo situation, appeal to the mythic resources which underlie the exchange system rather than to the system itself. For example, Kenelm

Burridge, in his classic studies, *Mambu and Tangu Traditions*, has demonstrated how the Tangu have reworked a traditional pedagogic tale concerning the relations between older and younger brother so as to reveal that the difference in status between the white man and the native is the result of an accident and is, therefore, in native terms, a situation of disequilibrium which requires exchange.⁴⁷

I should like to appeal to a similar model for the understanding of the myth of Hainuwele. That a cargo situation existed in the Moluccas is beyond dispute. After a period of "benign neglect," the Dutch embarked on a policy of intensive colonialist activities during the years 1902–10, which included the attempt to suppress ancestral and headhunting cults, the destruction of community houses, the use of Amboinese Christians as local administrators, and the imposition of a tax which had to be paid in cash rather than labor exchange.⁴⁸ It is this latter innovation which is crucial for my interpretation. While there were some minor revolts and instances of passive resistance in West Ceram,⁴⁹ they did not take the form of the nativistic and, at times, cargo cults, collectively known as the Mejapi movements (literally, the ones who hide) of the Central Celebes.⁵⁰

I would date Jensen's version of the Hainuwele tale to the same period. Hainuwele intrudes in an unexpected way on Wemale culture and produces cash (i.e., imported trade goods) in an abnormal and mysterious fashion—objects which have so great a value that no exchange is possible. But the Wemale have a *mythic precedent* for such novelty. In Ceramese myths, in primordial times, when Yam Woman, Sago Woman, or some other similar figure mysteriously produced an unknown form of food (usually by repulsive means), the figure was killed, the food consumed and, thereby, acculturated.⁵¹ The same archaic model, in the Hainuwele myth and under the pressure of the cargo situation, is daringly *reapplied* to the white man and his goods. Murder and eating are means of making something "ours." Furthermore, one might attempt to understand the movement from the living Hainuwele as a producer of cash to the dead Hainuwele as a producer of tubers as an attempt to reverse the situation, an attempt at converting cash into a "cash crop." By being reduced to tubers, Hainuwele provides a proper article for exchange analogous to the areca nuts and betel leaves which she failed to exchange in the myth.

The myth of Hainuwele is an application of this archaic mythologem to a new, cargo situation. The killing of Hainuwele does not represent a rupture with an ancestral age; rather it is her presence which disrupts traditional native society. The setting of the tale is not the mythic "once upon a time" but, rather, the painful, post-European "here and now."

The Ceramese myth of Hainuwele does not solve the problem, overcome the incongruity, or resolve the tension. Rather, it results in thought. It is a testing of the adequacy and applicability of traditional patterns and

categories to new situations and data in the hopes of achieving rectification. It is an act of native exegetical ingenuity, a process of native work.

I have attempted to demonstrate, both by close analysis of text and by careful attention to historical context, that the Babylonian Akitu festival and the Ceramese myth of Hainuwele are best described neither in terms of repetition of the past nor in terms of future fulfillment, but rather in terms of a difficult and incongruous present; that this present supplies the chief content of the text and delimits its function; that there is an almost casuistic dimension to these two documents which may be best described as "application"; that this incongruity is surprising in light of past precedents; but that it may only be addressed, worked with, and perhaps even overcome in terms of these same precedents. I have suggested that both of these texts have in common the attempt at rectification.

To be sure, the Babylonians did not regain their native kingship and the white man was not brought into conformity with native categories; he still fails to recognize a moral claim of reciprocity. But this is not how we judge success in matters of science. We judge harshly those who have abandoned the novel and the incongruous to a realm outside of the confines of understanding, and we value those who (even though failing) stubbornly make the attempt at achieving intelligibility, at achieving rectification of either the data or the model.

(Christchurch, 1949); C. R. H. Taylor, *A Select List of Books Relating to New Zealand and Certain Pacific Islands, 1912–1945* (Wellington, 1949); J. Harris, *A Guide to New Zealand Reference Materials*, 2d ed. (Dunedin, 1950); C. R. H. Taylor, *A Pacific Bibliography* (Wellington, 1951); I. E. Leeson, *A Bibliography of Bibliographies of the South Pacific* (Oxford, 1954); J. O. Wilson, *A Finding List of British Parliamentary Papers Relating to New Zealand, 1817–1900* (Wellington, 1960); R. A. Adams, *The Maori Wars: A Bibliography* (Wellington, 1961); R. O. Reilly and R. Tessier, *Tahitians: Répertoire bio-bibliographique* (Paris, 1962); F. M. Camack and S. Saito, *Pacific Island Bibliography* (New York, 1962); S. J. Cauchi, ed., *A Bibliography of New Zealand Bibliographies: Preliminary Edition* (Wellington, 1967); E. Reiner, *Geographischer Literaturbericht Neuseeland, 1962–1972* (Cologne, 1974).

Chapter 6

1. On cargo, nativistic, and revitalization movements, see the extensive descriptive bibliography in W. La Barre, "Materials for a History of Studies of Crisis Cults," *Current Anthropology* 12 (1971): 3–44. For the use of these materials for the interpretation of Jewish traditions, see, among others, S. Isenberg, "Millenarianism in Greco-Roman Palestine," *Religion* 4 (1974): 26–46; in Christian tradition, see, among others, J. Gager, *Kingdom and Community* (Englewood Cliffs, 1975), esp. chap. 2.

2. For another aspect of incongruity, see J. Z. Smith, *Map Is Not Territory* (Leiden, 1978), pp. 190–207.

3. In this chapter, I have drawn freely on two previously published essays, Smith, *Map Is Not Territory*, pp. 67–87 and 289–309.

4. I have altered the standard English translation (see below, n. 5) at this point from "subordinate" to "protected citizen," of Babylon. In rendering the text in this manner, I have followed the interpretation of W. F. Leemans, "Kidinnu: Une symbole de droit divin babylonien," in M. David, B. A. van Groningen, and E. M. Meijers, eds., *Symbolae ad jus et historiam antiquitatis: Festschrift J. C. van Oven* (Leiden, 1946), pp. 31–61, esp. pp. 54–59. In relatively late materials (listed in Leemans, p. 54, n. 80), "les *šābē kidinni* ne sont mentionnés que dans certaines villes babyloniennes: Babylone, Borsippa, Sippar, Nippur et Uruk . . . ces villes mentionnés . . . sont toutes des vieux centres du culte des dieux. Les *šābē kidinni* de ces villes furent les citoyens [p. 55] . . . le *kidinnu* fut un emblème divin, les *šābē kidinni* furent les citoyens qui se rangeaient sous cet emblème" [p. 56]. Leemans goes on to argue that *šābē kidinni* is a term which refers to the protection of the privileges of the citizens of ancient Babylonian cities by Assyrian monarchs against, "les habitants de la campagne" and marauders such as the Chaldeans and Arameans. "Après l'effondrement de la domination assyrienne il n'est plus jamais question de *šābē kidinni* ou de *kidinnūtu* en matière de droit publique. C'est seulement en matière religieuse [p. 57, citing the Akitu festival text] . . . c'était particulièrement les rois assyriens qui protégeaient les *šābē kidinni*. Ce titre ils pouvaient le trouver dans les fonctions de l'autorité cléricale suprême, dans lesquelles ils furent précisément reconnus par les prêtres qui régnaient dans les villes anciennes; c'est comme tels qu'ils étaient les exécuteurs de la protection divine. C'est dans cette exécution qu'ils usaient de toutes sortes de privilèges séculiers" [p. 59]. Leemans cites several Assyrian royal texts which reestablish certain tax exemptions and other fiscal benefits (*andurāru*) for the "citoyens opprimés de Babylone, en particulier les *šābē kidinni*, les protégés d'Anu et d'Enlil" [p. 59]. See further A. L. Oppenheim, *Ancient Mesopotamia* (Chicago, 1964), pp. 120–22. While altering the translation of line 426, I have retained the standard English translation, "dependents," in line 444.

5. Translation by A. Sachs, in J. B. Pritchard, ed., *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament*, 2d ed. (Princeton, 1955), p. 344, of F. Thureau-Dangin, *Rituels accadiens* (Paris, 1921), p. 144.

6. P. Lambrechts, "Les fêtes phrygiennes de Cybèle et d'Attis," *Bulletin de l'Institut belge de Rom* 27 (1952): 141–70; *Over griekse en oosterse mysteriengodsdiensten: De sogenante Adonismysterien* (Brussels, 1954); "La resurrection d'Adonis," *Annuaire de l'Institut de philologie et d'histoire orientales et slaves* 13 (1955): 207–40; *Attis, van herdersknaap tot god* (Brussels, 1962); *Attis en het feest der Hilariën* (Amsterdam, 1967). Alongside Lambrechts, with particular reference to the Babylonian materials, see the crucial article by W. von Soden, "Gibt es ein Zeugnis dafür, dass die Babylonier an die Wiederauferstehung Marduks geglaubt haben?" *Zeitschrift für Assyriologie*, n.s., 17 (1955): 130–66.

7. A useful bibliography of older studies in which each of these options may be found is in I. Engnell, *Studies in Divine Kingship in the Ancient Near East* (Oxford, 1967), pp. 201–2. For the historian of religion, the most balanced treatments remain A. J. Wensinck, "The Semitic New Year and the Origin of Eschatology," *Acta Orientalia* 1 (1923): 159–99, and G. Furlani, "L'umiliazione del re durante la festa di Capodanno a Babele," *Studi e materiali di storia delle religioni* 4 (1928): 5–16 and 305–7. There are some judicious remarks in J. J. Stamm, *Das Leiden des Unschuldigen in Babylon und Israel* (Zurich, 1946), esp. pp. 30–32, and a useful typology in V. Lanternari, *La grande festa: Storia del Capodanno nelle civiltà primitive* (Milan, 1959), pp. 441–67.

8. A remote parallel has been suggested in the beating of the king in the archaic Indian *rājasūya* ritual (see *Śatapatha-brāhmana* V.4 and *Kātyāyana-śrautasūtra* XV.7 in A. Weber, *Über die Königsweihe: Den Rājasūya* [Berlin, 1893], p. 63), by R. Pettazzoni, *La confessione dei peccati* (Bologna, 1935), 1:94–95, and J. C. Heesterman, *The Ancient Indian Royal Consecration* (The Hague, 1957), p. 156, and cf. pp. 4–5 and 141. While I remain unconvinced by the parallel, I have been influenced in my general approach to the Akitu festival by Weber's interpretation of the *rājasūya* ritual.

9. For a detailed study of the well-known "negative confession" in the Egyptian Book of the Dead, chap. 125, see C. Maystre, *Les déclarations d'innocence* (Cairo, 1937). For a comparison between the Egyptian and Babylonian negative confessions, see Pettazzoni, *La confessione dei peccati*, 2:1–24 and 88–103. Both Maystre's and Pettazzoni's interpretations are flawed by the use of the rubric "magic."

10. A. K. Grayson, *Babylonian Historical-Literary Texts* (Toronto, 1975), pp. 56, 69–71. On the matter of Seleucid "copies" of more archaic texts, see J. Z. Smith, *Map Is Not Territory*, pp. 71–72.

11. H. W. F. Saggs, *The Greatness That Was Babylon* (New York, 1962), p. 385. I regret that S. K. Eddy, *The King Is Dead: Studies in Near Eastern Resistance to Hellenism, 334–31 B.C.* (Lincoln, 1961), p. 107, whose interpretation of the religious history of the period has been fundamental for the point of view expressed in this chapter, shares the same presumption.

12. See von Soden, "Gibt es ein Zeugnis?" pp. 131, 158, 161–66. Cf. F. M. Th. de Liagre Böhl, "Die Religion der Babylonier und Assyrier," in F. König, ed., *Christus und die Religionen der Erde* (Freiburg, 1951), 2:477; G. van Dreele, *The Cult of Aššur* (The Hague, 1974).

13. See, for example, the texts in D. D. Luckenbill, *The Ancient Records of Assyria* (Chicago, 1927), 2:70 and 127.

14. See above, n. 5. The texts are cited in Leemans, "Kidinnu," p. 54 and n. 80 (texts c and d).

15. The standard edition is W. Dittenberger, *Orientalis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae* (Leipzig, 1903), 1:253. See the new restoration and full discussion in M. Zambelli, "L'ascesa al trono di Antioco IV Epifane di Siria," *Rivista di filologia e di istruzione classica* 38 (1960): 363–89, esp. pp. 374–80. See further, O. Mørkholm, *Antiochus IV of Syria* (Copenhagen, 1966), pp. 118–22, 132.

16. See T. H. Gaster, *Thespis*, 2d ed. (Garden City, 1961), p. 33, who supplies comparative material (largely drawn, without attribution, from J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, 3d ed. [London, 1935], 7:248–50) and hints at such an interpretation of the second slapping of the king at the Akitu festival. F. F. Hvidberg, *Graad og Latter i det Gamle Testamente* (Copenhagen, 1938), p. 11, while providing much valuable material for Israelitic and Canaanite traditions, misses this text in the Akitu festival, being thoroughly under the sway of the “dying-rising” pattern.

17. KAR 143:34 and 219:8/VAT 9555 and 9538 in S. Langdon, *The Babylonian Epic of Creation* (Oxford, 1923), p. 41. See the entire translation (pp. 34–49) and Langdon’s discussion (pp. 50–59). The text was first discussed, in connection with the “dying-rising” pattern, by H. Zimmern, “Zum babylonischen Neujahrsfest: Zweiter Beitrag,” *Berichte über die Verhandlungen der Königlich Sächsischen Gesellschaft, philol.-hist. Klasse*, 70 (1918): 2–20, and, most explicitly from this point of view, in S. H. Hooke, *Babylonian and Assyrian Religion* (New York, 1953), pp. 111–14. This interpretation collapses before von Soden’s careful analysis of the text in “Gibt es ein Zeugnis?” (see the pages cited above, n. 12). See further, G. Meier, “Ein Kommentar zu einer Selbstprädikation des Marduk aus Assur,” *Zeitschrift für Assyriologie*, n.s. 13 (1942): 241–46, esp. p. 245, and W. G. Lambert, “The Great Battle of the Mesopotamian New Year: The Conflict in the Akitu House,” *Iraq* 25 (1963): 189–90.

18. Thureau-Dangin, *Rituels accadiens*, p. 136 (lines 279–84).

19. S. A. Pallis, *The Babylonian Akitu Festival* (Copenhagen, 1926), p. 232.

20. W. G. Lambert, “A New Look at the Babylonian Background of Genesis,” *Journal of Theological Studies*, n.s. 16 (1965): 291.

21. Compare the bilingual text from Sippar, which describes the creation of the world by Marduk as a process of temple construction. A. Heidel, *The Babylonian Genesis*, 2d ed. (Chicago, 1951), pp. 61–63.

22. To this construct might be compared the materials published by A. K. Grayson and W. G. Lambert, “Akkadian Prophecies,” *Journal of Cuneiform Studies* 18 (1964): 7–30; W. W. Hallo, “Akkadian Apocalypses,” *Israel Exploration Journal* 16 (1966): 231–42; R. D. Biggs, “More Akkadian Prophecies,” *Iraq* 29 (1967): 117–32; H. Hunger and S. A. Kaufman, “A New Akkadian Prophecy Text,” *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 95 (1975): 371–75. In this series, one Seleucid text has been published (Biggs, “More Akkadian Prophecies,” pp. 128–32) possibly from Babylon. A new Seleucid composition, “The Dynastic Prophecy,” has been published by A. K. Grayson, *Babylonian Historical-Literary Texts*, pp. 24–37.

23. See above, n.4, and the important text published by F. M. Th. de Liagre Böhl, *Der babylonische Fürstenspiegel* (Leipzig, 1937), on which see W. G. Lambert, *Babylonian Wisdom Literature* (Oxford, 1960), pp. 110–15, and I. M. Diakonoff, “A Babylonian Political Pamphlet,” *Studies in Honor of Benno Landsberger* (Chicago, 1965), pp. 343–50.

24. Pritchard, *Ancient Near Eastern Texts*, p. 317.

25. See, for example, Eddy, *The King Is Dead*, pp. 159–60. I regret Eddy’s interpretation, as he is one of the few scholars to insist on the importance of the decline of native kingship.

26. See the important article on this theme by E. Osswald, “Zum Problem der vaticinia ex eventu,” *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft* 75 (1963): 27–44.

27. Texts cited in R. Labat, *Le poème babylonien de la création* (Paris, 1935), p. 18.

28. See the edition of the fragments of Berossus in F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* (Berlin, 1923–), 3C:364–97 (no. 680), and the older edition by P. Schnabel, *Berossus und die babylonisch-hellenistische Literatur* (Leipzig, 1923), pp. 250–75. Schnabel’s work is the only substantial monograph on Berossus. Most works are consecrated to a recovery of historical realia. I have been much stimulated by the recent study by R.

Drews, “The Babylonian Chronicles and Berossus,” *Iraq* 37 (1975): 39–55. The following paragraphs on Berossus have been adopted from J. Z. Smith, *Map Is Not Territory*, pp. 68–70.

29. Jacoby, *Fragmente*, is unable to accept this totality and splits Berossus in two! The historian described by Jewish and Christian authors is identified by Jacoby as Berossus of Babylon; the astrological material transmitted by Greek and Latin authors is attributed to “pseudo-Berossus of Cos,” wholly an invention by Jacoby. See Drews, “Babylonian Chronicles and Berossus,” pp. 51–54.

30. Jacoby, *Fragmente*, has sundered this correlation by assigning Abydenus’s cosmic material to F1 and his “historical” account to F6. They occur together in Eusebius *Præparatio evangelica* 9.41, and in the Armenian translation of the *Chronicle* 49 (pp. 18–19).

31. On Berossus, F21 (= Seneca *Naturales Quaestiones* 3.29), see J. Bidez, “Bérosee et la grande année,” *Mélanges P. Fredericq* (Brussels, 1904), pp. 9–19; P. Schnabel, “Apokalyptische Berechnung der Endzeiten bei Berossos,” *Orientalistische Literaturzeitung* 13 (1910): 401–2 and *Berossos* pp. 94–109; W. Gundel in F. Boll and C. Bezold, *Stern Glaube und Sterndeutung*, 4th ed. (Leipzig and Berlin, 1931), pp. 200–205 (cf. W. and H. G. Gundel, *Astrologumena* [Wiesbaden, 1966], pp. 45–46 and n. 14); B. L. van Waerden, “Das grosse Jahr und die ewige Wiederkehr,” *Hermes* 80 (1952): 129–55; B. Sticker, “Weltzeitalter und astronomische Perioden,” *Saeculum* 4 (1953): 241–49; V. Nikiprowetsky, *La troisième sibylle* (Paris, 1970), pp. 88–122; M. Hengel, *Judaism and Hellenism* (Philadelphia, 1974), 1:191–93; and J. J. Collins, *The Sibylline Oracles of Egyptian Judaism* (Missoula, 1974), pp. 101–7 et passim.

32. G. de Vries, *Bij de Berg-Alfoeren op West-Seran: Zeden, Gewoonten en Mythologie van een Oervolk* (Zutphen, 1927), pp. 152–57. In this version, the protagonist is a miraculous male child!

33. A. E. Jensen, “Eine ost-indische Myth als Ausdruck einer Weltanschauung,” *Paideuma* 1 (1938–40): 199–216, and, with H. Niggemeyer, *Hainuwele: Völkerzählungen von der Molluken-Insel Ceram* (Frankfurt am Main, 1938), esp. pp. 59–65. These early treatments established the basic lines of Jensen’s interpretation which he was to repeat in a variety of works. See especially, “Das Weltbild einer frühen Kultur,” *Paideuma* 3 (1944): 1–83; *Die drei Ströme: Züge aus dem geistigen Leben der Wemale* (Leipzig, 1948), esp. pp. 88–92, 98–101, 114–16; *Das religiöse Weltbild einer frühen Kultur* (Stuttgart, 1948); “Das mythische Weltbetrachtung der alten Pflanzervölker,” *Eranos-Jahrbuch* 17 (1950): 421–73; *Mythos und Kult bei Naturvölkern* (Wiesbaden, 1951), with an English translation, *Myth and Cult among Primitive Peoples* (Chicago, 1963), which was the subject of an intensive review and discussion in *Current Anthropology* 6 (1965): 199–215; “Der Ursprung des Bodenbaus in mythologischer Sicht,” *Paideuma* 6 (1956): 169–80; “Prometheus und Hainuwele-Mythologem: Eine Apologie,” *Anthropos* 58 (1963): 145–86.

34. For a statement of the consensus portrait, see J. Z. Smith, “Dema Deities,” *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 15th ed., 3:454. The most suggestive challenge to Jensen, thus far, is V. Lanternari, *La grande festa*, esp. chap. 4. The most important extension of Jensen’s work is O. Zerries, “Die kulturgeschichtliche Bedeutung einiger Mythen aus Südamerika über den Ursprung der Pflanzen,” *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* 77 (1952): 62–82, and, especially, “Entstehung oder Erwerb der Kulturpflanzen und Beginn des Bodenbaus im Mythos der Indianer Südamerikas,” *Paideuma* 15 (1969): 64–124. See further the use of the “Hainuwele-mythologem” in P. J. Raats, “A Structural Study of Bogobo Myths and Rites,” *Asian Folklore Studies* 29 (1970): 1–132, esp. pp. 62–81, and cf. 22–23, 53–56 et passim. I find the debate between C. Schmitz, “Die Problematik der Mythologem ‘Hainuwele’ und ‘Prometheus,’” *Anthropos* 55 (1960): 215–37, and Jensen, “Prometheus und Hainuwele Mythologem,” unilluminating.

35. The full narrative is given in German translation in Jensen, *Hainuwele*, pp. 59–65 (no. 11), and *Das religiöse Weltbild*, pp. 34–38. There is an English translation in J. Campbell, *The Masks of God: Primitive Mythology* (New York, 1959), pp. 173–76.

36. The banana-stone tale is one variant of Thompson motif A1335.3, *Origin of Death from an Unwise Choice* (S. Thompson, *Motif-Index of Folk-Literature*, 2d ed. [Bloomington, 1955–58]). The Wemale version is somewhat atypical in that it is not choice by the ancestors, but a violent contest between the banana and a stone. See the text in Jensen, *Hainuwele*, pp. 39–43 (no. 1), esp. pp. 39–40. For a more typical version from the neighboring Central Celebes, see J. G. Frazer, *The Belief in Immortality and the Worship of the Dead* (London, 1913), 1:74–75.

37. Thompson motifs A2611, *Plants from Body of Slain Person*, and A2611.0.1, *Plants from Grave of Slain Person*. Cf. B. F. Kirtley, *A Motif Index of Traditional Polynesian Tales* (Honolulu, 1971), pp. 105–6; R. E. Mitchell, *The Folktales of Micronesia* (Nagoya, 1971), pp. 245–46. Regrettably, no similar index exists for the Indonesian culture complex, but see G. Hatt, “The Corn Mother in America and Indonesia,” *Anthropos* 46 (1951), esp. pp. 844–91 for a rich collection. Raats, “Structural Study of Bogobo Myths,” pp. 44–45, adds useful parallels from the Malay Archipelago.

38. For early reports of *hárta*, see the texts cited in W. P. Groenveltd, “Notes on the Malay Archipelago and Malacca Compiled from Chinese Sources,” *Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor de Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië* 39 (1880): 102, 119; W. W. Rockhill, “Notes on the Relations and Trade of China with the Eastern Archipelago and the Coasts of the Indian Ocean during the Fourteenth Century,” *T'oung Pao* 16 (1915): 257, 260; and M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofs, *Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630* (The Hague, 1962), pp. 99, 158 et passim. Meilink-Roelofs notes that “the inhabitants of the Moluccas gave higher prices [in spices] for Chinese porcelain than could be obtained anywhere else” (p. 99). Compare the early European reference to the use of Chinese porcelain, brass, and copper as “money” in the Moluccas in Gonzalo Fernandez de Oviedo de Valdes, *Historia general y natural de las Indias y tierra firme del mar oceano* (Seville, 1535) in the edition of D. José Almador de los Rios (Madrid, 1852), 1:100–105, and appendix, plate 1, fig. 1, on which, see D. Lach, *Asia in the Making of Europe* (Chicago, 1965), 1.2:600–601.

Jensen quite rightly notes that the word *hárta* (of Malaysian derivation) signifies all imported articles (*Die drei Ströme*, p. 59) and that “Hárta ist ‘Heiratsgeld’ aber auch eine Sammelbezeichnung für nicht-ceramesischen Kulturgut, das einen besonderen Vermögenwert darstellt, wie chinesische Teller, Gongs und andere Metallsachen” (*Hainuwele*, p. 50), but he fails to perceive its significance, arguing only that, because of the pristine, archaic mentality of the Wemale and their holistic way of life, *hárta* is “not perceived as everyday imported wares, but rather as a divine gift which had been given to man in primordial times” (*Die drei Ströme*, p. 248). In keeping with his tendency to archaize his data, Jensen notes a homology between *hárta* and the head taken in headhunting (*Die drei Ströme*, p. 246) on the basis of inconclusive evidence from E. Stresemann, “Religiöse Gebräuche auf Seran,” *Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde* 62 (1923): 308, 346. Hatt (“Corn Mother,” p. 889) attempts a similar identification, on the basis of Jensen’s tale 21 (*Hainuwele*, p. 71) and argues for a general Indonesian pattern of jewels and wealth being symbolically equivalent to food.

To the Hainuwele narrative should be compared Jensen’s tale 45 (*Hainuwele*, pp. 101–2) which shares a number of motifs, and, especially, his tale 264 (*Hainuwele*, pp. 299–300), in which an eel instructs a young man to slay him; from his eyes come tall trees (cf. Thompson motif A2611.3), and from their leaves, Chinese porcelains and gongs.

39. Compare the materials on anal creation and the interrelation of *Geld*, *Gold und Kot* in A. Dundes, “Earth Diver: Creation of the Mythopoeic Male,” *American Anthropologist*

64 (1962): 1032–51; and the useful anthology edited by E. Borneman, *The Psychoanalysis of Money* (New York, 1976).

40. See the summary of Jensen’s position regarding “die zentrale mythische Idee” in *Die drei Ströme*, p. xi.

41. See, among other loci, Jensen, “Spiel und Ergriffenheit,” *Paideuma* 2 (1942): 124–39; *Die drei Ströme*, pp. 275–77; *Myth and Cult*, pp. 4–6, 59–79, et passim. Note that, in general conformity to the presuppositions of the Frobenius school, Jensen consistently devalues “application” as a “depletion.” For a further discussion and critique of Jensen’s notion of “application,” see chap. 3, above.

42. K. Burridge, *Mambu: A Study of Melanesian Cargo Movements and Their Social and Ideological Background* (New York, 1970), pp. 82–85.

43. The classic study of exchange and reciprocity remains M. Mauss, *Essai sur le don* (Paris, 1925). Perhaps the most useful recent treatment (with rich bibliography) is M. Sahlins, “On the Sociology of Primitive Exchange,” in M. Banton, ed., *The Relevance of Models in Social Anthropology* (London, 1965), pp. 139–236.

44. Cf. K. Burridge, *New Heaven and New Earth: A Study of Millenarian Activities* (New York, 1969), pp. 145–49 et passim.

45. The theme of the white ancestors appears to be a subtype of the widespread motif that the ancestors/dead are the reverse of the living. See J. Z. Smith, *Map Is Not Territory*, pp. 157–58, n. 31. It is possible to advance the proposition: no tradition that ancestors are white, no cargo cult.

46. It has been the special merit of V. Lanternari to insist on the relationship of the archaic motifs of white ancestors, the ship of the dead, and the return of the dead at New Year festivals to the cargo cults. See V. Lanternari, “Origini storiche dei culti profetici melanesiani,” *Studi e materiali di storia delle religioni* 27 (1956): 77–82; *La grande festa*, pp. 411–40 et passim, and *The Religions of the Oppressed* (New York, 1963), pp. 166–67, 185–87.

47. Burridge, *Mambu*, pp. 154–76, and Burridge, *Tangu Traditions* (Oxford, 1969), pp. 113–14, 229–30, 330, 400–411.

48. Despite Jensen’s insistence that, unlike the coastal peoples (*Die drei Ströme*, pp. 6–10), the inland and highland tribes escaped the impact of the European—he, in fact, documents each of these nativistic elements (*Die drei Ströme*, pp. 35–45)—although not to the degree of the Christianized or Islamized coast. On the latter, see the work of Jensen’s colleague, J. Roder, *Alahatala: Die Religion der Inlandstämme Mittelcerams* (Frankfurt am Main, 1948) and note the role of the Christian Ceramese in the abortive 1950 rebellion (on which see J. M. van der Kroef, “The South Moluccan Insurrection in Indonesia,” *Journal of East Asiatic Studies* 1 [1954]: 1–20, and the apologia by G. Decker, *Republik Maluku Selatan* [Göttingen, 1957]). The Moluccan rebellion against the Dutch continues.

49. Jensen, *Die drei Ströme*, pp. 42–43. One suspects that, if Jensen’s interest in the topic had been greater, much more could have been reported.

50. For the classic description of the Mejapi movements, see A. C. Kruyt and N. Adriani, “De Godsdienstig-Politeke Beweging ‘Mejapi’ op Celebes,” *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië* 67 (1913): 135–51. For a brief English description, see J. M. van der Kroef, “Messianic Movements in the Celebes, Sumatra, and Borneo,” in S. L. Thrupp, ed., *Millennial Dreams in Action* (New York, 1970), esp. pp. 80–91. To be sure, the Kakihan association was preeminently considered to be a political movement by colonial administrators and missionaries in Ceram until the pioneering work by J. G. F. Riedel, *De sluik- en kroesharige Rassen tusschen Selebes en Papua* (The Hague, 1886), esp. pp. 107–11, recognized its nature as a native, religious, secret society. See further the important dissertation by J. P. Duyvendak, *Het Kakean-Genootschap van Seran* (Almelo, 1926), who stresses the Melanesian parallels. For colonial attempts at suppression, see Jensen, *Die drei Ströme*, p. 42.

51. See, among others, Jensen, *Hainuwele*, pp. 69–71 (nos. 17–22) and de Vries, *Bij de Berg-Alfoeren*, pp. 257–58. For a most elaborate example from the neighboring Lesser Sunda Islands, see P. A. Burger, "Manggaraise verhalen over het ontstann van der rijst en de mais," *Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde* 81 (1941): 411–23.

Chapter 7

1. For this brief historical narrative, I have drawn on the convenient account in E. J. Sharpe, *Comparative Religion: A History* (London, 1975), pp. 119–43.
2. For the role of the Lisbon earthquake in the European history of ideas, see T. D. Kendrick, *The Lisbon Earthquake* (Philadelphia, 1957).
3. Montaigne, "Of Cannibals," in *The Complete Works of Montaigne*, trans. D. M. Frame (Stanford, 1958), pp. 152–53.
4. D. Z. Phillips, *Faith and Philosophical Enquiry* (London, 1970), p. 237, as quoted in R. Trigg, *Reason and Commitment* (Cambridge, 1973), p. 22.
5. Trigg, *Reason and Commitment*, pp. 24–25.
6. In addition to contemporary press accounts, I have used J. Maguire and M. L. Dunn, *Hold Hands and Die* (New York, 1978), M. Kilduff and R. Javers, *The Suicide Cult* (New York, 1978); C. Krause, *Guyana Massacre* (New York, 1978) and the useful collection of source materials in S. Rose, *Jesus and Jim Jones* (New York, 1979). I have also made use of the Report of a Staff Investigative Group to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, *The Assassination of Representative Leo J. Ryan and the Jonestown Guyana Tragedy* (Washington, D.C., 1979). Despite a number of more recent works, published since 1980, I have not seen cause to alter this essay in either matters of fact or, especially, in conclusions.
7. *New York Times*, 5 December 1978.
8. *United Methodist Reporter*, December 1978, as quoted in Rose, *Jesus and Jim Jones*, p. 186.
9. Subsequent to the original presentation of this essay (1980), J. L. Reston, Jr., gained access to 900 hours of these tapes through a freedom-of-information suit. Reston's book, *Our Father Who Art in Hell* (New York, 1981), makes little use of this precious material. A 90-minute selection from the tapes was played over National Public Radio in April 1981. While the editing and selection were savagely contrived, there is enough in this selection (including Jones interpreting himself by means of a full-blown gnostic myth) to indicate that a careful study of the entire collection of tapes by a trained and sensitive historian of religion would yield valuable results.
10. Euripides *Bacchae*, especially lines 672–768.
11. Livy *History* 39. 16.
12. J. Moore, as quoted in Rose, *Jesus and Jim Jones*, p. 132.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 162.
14. J. Jones, as quoted in Rose, *Jesus and Jim Jones*, pp. 30 and 32.
15. See Appendix 2 for the full text.
16. Krause, *Guyana Massacre*, p. 132.
17. For factual material, I have used J. G. Miller, "Naked Cults in Central West Santos," *Journal of the Polynesian Society* 57 (1948): 330–41; J. Guiart, "'Cargo Cults' and Political Evolution in Melanesia," *South Pacific* 5 (1951): 128–29; Guiart, "Forerunners of Melanesian Nationalism," *Oceania* 22 (1951): 81–90. My interpretation of the exchange ideology of total destruction is quite different from the understanding of this radical act in M. Eliade, *The Two and the One* (New York, 1965), pp. 125–28.
18. J. Z. Smith, *Map Is Not Territory* (Leiden, 1978), pp. 305–7, and chap. 6, above.

Index

- Abydenus, 95–96
 Academic study of religion, xi–xiii, 5–8, 19–20, 36, 43–44, 61, 66, 102–5, 110–12, 120
 Adanson, M., 4
 Akitu festival, 90–96, 99, 101
 Alt, A., 47
 Amasis, 55–56
 Anderson, J. C., 70
 Antiochus IV, 12, 92–95
 Apocalypticism, 90–96
 Apocalyptic pattern, 94–95
 Apocalyptic situation, 94
 Application, 41–44, 93, 100–101
 Aristotle, 20
- Bartholomaeus Anglicus, 45
 Bear Festival, 63–64
 Bear Hunting as ritual, 57–61
 Beckner, M., 4
 Bergson, H., 22
 Berossus, 95–96
 Best, E., 72–73, 78, 80
 Black, M., 36
 Boas, F., 24
 Borges, J. L., 31, 53, 57
 Buck, P., 75
 Burrige, K., 99–100
- Canon, 36–52; definition of, 48
 Cargo cults, 83, 90, 98–101, 118–20
 Cargo situation, 98–100
 Catalogue, 45–48
 Ceram, mythology of, 96–101
 Cicero, 38–39, 44
 Circumcision, characteristic of Judaism, 9–14
 Clapcott, J., 118–19
 Classification of religions, 1–18
 Comparison of religions, 19–52
 Cook, J., 81
 Craig, E. W. G., 73
 Creation myths, 66–90, 96–101, 149–54
 Culture as cuisine, 39–40
- Davis, C. O., 74–76
 De Bovis, E., 78
 Definition of religion, Cicero's, 38–39, 44
 Dema deity, 96–97
 Dionysiac pattern, 112–17
- Egypt, circumcision in, 10, 13–14; Jewish inscriptions from, 15–17
 Elephant hunting and ritual, 62–63
 Eliade, M., 25, 29, 41, 67, 70, 87
 Encyclopaedic comparison, 23, 31
 Enlightenment, and study of religion, 102–5
Enuma elish, 93–97
 Essence of religions, 6–8
 Ethnographic comparison, 22–23, 34
 Euripides, 112–13, 117
 Evolutionary schemata, 8, 24
 Exchange ideologies, 97–99, 119–20
 Exegetical ingenuity, 39–44, 52
- Firth, R., 37
 Focusing lens, sacred as, 54–55
 Frazer, J. G., 21, 103
 Freud, S., 10, 36, 53; and definition of ritual, 38–39, 44
 Frobenius, L., 42
 Funerary inscriptions, Jewish, 9, 14–18
- Gardiner, A. H., 45
 Gnostic pattern, 94
 Goethe, J. W. von, 23
 Goodenough, E. R., 15, 29, 32–33, 35
 Goody, J., 67, 87
 Grayson, A. K., 92
 Griaule, M., 49
 Gudgeon, T. W., 79
 Gudgeon, W. E., 68–70, 76, 78–79, 82, 86
 Guest, ideology of, 59
 Guyana, Jonestown, 104–20, 126–34
- Hadrian and circumcision, 11
 Hainuwele, 96–101
 Hollowell, A. I., 58