Date: September 12, 2024
Time: 3:30 pm - 5:00 pm
The Speaker:
Chelsea Bowden (Denison University)
Pyrrhonist Preferences and Moral Action
Skeptics (and particularly Pyrrhonian Skeptics) have historically gotten a bad rap when it comes to
living an ethical life. Both ancient and contemporary philosophers argue that owing to some central
features of the Pyrrhonist’s philosophical way of life—the so-called “Skeptic Way”—she will be
unable or unlikely to perform morally good actions, especially in unjust socio-political contexts. This
paper will explore whether and to what extent the Pyrrhonist, who (a) lives a life wholly without
belief (adoxastōs) and (b) continuously pursues tranquility (ataraxia), can and will act in ways we would
deem morally good. In doing so I will examine three specific charges leveled against the Pyrrhonist
by philosophers who claim she is unable or unlikely to act ethically because she lacks the necessary
psychological resources—beliefs and commitments—to do so. I ultimately argue that, though the
Pyrrhonist lacks beliefs and commitments, she instead has resources that are functionally equivalent
in her stable desires and preferences. I maintain that the Pyrrhonist’s desires and preferences are
likely to lead her to reliably perform actions of positive moral worth (and perhaps even more often
than her dogmatic counterparts) in those unjust socio-political contexts put forward by her
detractors.